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I. Introduction
In 2010, most of the significant legal developments in the cultural heritage field con-
cerned questions of recovery of art works and other cultural materials that had been ex-
propriated sometime in the past, particularly during the Holocaust. Over the last year,
international treaties concerning cultural property continued to gain acceptance, while
lawsuits involving the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act were resolved, and negotiations
concerning bilateral agreements between the United States and other nations to restrict
import of undocumented archaeological materials continued.
H. International Conventions and Agreements
A. NEW STATES PARTIEs
There were no new States Parties to either the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protec-
tion of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict' or its First Protocol. 2 Three
new nations, Georgia, Belgium, and Colombia, joined the Convention's Second Proto-
col. 3 The Guidelines for the implementation of the Second Protocol were adopted in
November 2009,4 and the Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict was established. This action enables the system of enhanced
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1. See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regula-
tions for the Execution of the Convention 1954, May 14, 1954, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-1, 249 U.N.T.S. 240.
2. See Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/
Volume%202253/v2253.pdf.
3. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict 1999, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 212, available at http://portal.unesco.org/la/
convention.asp?KO=15207&language=E.
4. See UNESCO, Guidelines for the Implementation of the 1999 Second Protocol to the Hague Conven-
tion of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Nov. 24, 2009, available
at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001867/186742E.pdf
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protection for particularly significant cultural property, established in Articles ten through
fourteen of the Second Protocol, to come into effect.5
Haiti and Equatorial Guinea joined the 1970 United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO") Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (the
"1970 UNESCO Convention"), which brought the total number of States Parties to one
hundred twenty-three. 6 Six nations-Italy, Gabon, Argentina, Honduras, Trinidad and
Tobago, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo-ratified the 2001 UNESCO Con-
vention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, bringing the number of
States Parties to this Convention to thirty-five.7
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1970 UNESCO CONVENTION
In 2010, pursuant to the implementing legislation for the 1970 UNESCO Convention,
Switzerland concluded new bilateral agreements with Colombia and Egypt. Switzerland
now has agreements with five nations restricting the import of illegally exported cultural
property.8 In accord with its agreement with Peru, Switzerland returned to Peru forty-
eight Pre-Columbian artifacts, consisting of ceramics and textiles of the Chancay and
Chimu cultures that dated to the tenth to fourteenth centuries A.D.9
The United States extended its bilateral agreements ("Memoranda of Understanding")
with El SalvadorI0 and with Nicaragua," each for an additional five-year period. Such
agreements, which restrict the importation of archaeological and ethnographic materials
into the United States, last for a maximum of five years but may be renewed an unlimited
number of times. In addition to extending the agreements, Article II of both agreements
was amended. The U.S. Cultural Property Advisory Committee also considered ex-
tending the bilateral agreements with Italy and Colombia, but no decision was an-
5. See Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, UNESCO, http://
portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URLID=37217&URL_DO=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=201.
html (last visited Jan. 8, 2011).
6. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14,1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231. The list of State Parties maybe obtained
on UNESCO's website. Conventions, UNESCO, http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&
language=E (last visited Jan. 8, 2011).
7. Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, Nov. 2, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 40 (2002).
The list of States Parties may be obtained on UNESCO's website. Conventions, UNESCO, http://portal.
unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13520&language=E (last visited Jan. 8, 2011).
8. Switzerland had previously concluded agreements with Italy, Greece, and Peru. See Bilateral Agree-
ments, BUNDESAMT FOR KULTUR [Federal Office of Culture], http://www.bak.admin.ch/themen/kul-
turguetertransfer/01985/index.html?lang=en (last visited Jan. 8, 2011). Unlike U.S. agreements, the Swiss
agreements can last in perpetuity with no need for renewal. See id.
9. La Suisse rend au Pirou 48 objets pricolumbiens [Switzerland Returns 48 Pre-Colombian Objects to Perul,
OFFICE F9DRALE DE LA CULTURE [Federal Office of Culture], June 29, 2010, http://www.20min.ch/ro/
news/suisse/story/La-Suisse-rend-au-Perou-48-objets-precolombiens- 13432083.
10. See El Salvador, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop/esfact.html (last
visitedJan. 8, 2011).
11. See Nicaragua, U.S. DEPT OF STATE, http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop/nifact.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 8, 2011).
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nounced.12 Finally, the Hellenic Republic (Greece) presented a new request to the United
States for a bilateral agreement under Article 9 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.' 3
III. Foreign Sovereign Imunities Act Litigation
A. CASSIRER
Claude Cassirer sued the Kingdom of Spain ("Spain") and the Thyssen-Bornemisza
Collection Foundation ("Foundation") to recover a painting, Rae Saint-Honore apris midi,
effet de pluie, by Camille Pissarro, owned by his grandmother, Lilly Cassirer.14 In 1939,
when she sought to leave Germany because of Nazi persecution, she was forced to sell the
painting, for which she never received payment. The painting was ultimately confiscated
by the Gestapo, sold through several hands (including a New York gallery), and finally
purchased by Baron Thyssen-Bornemisza after 1976. The painting is now in the collec-
tion of the Thyssen-Bornemisza Museum, an instrumentality of Spain, in Madrid. In
2000, Cassirer learned the location of the painting and requested its return. In 2005,
without having pursued any judicial proceedings in Spain, Cassirer filed suit in federal
district court in California against the Foundation and Spain. In 2006, the district court
denied motions to dismiss brought by Spain and the Foundation.' 5
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered only the question of whether the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA")16 permitted a suit against a foreign state under the
FSIA's expropriation exception,' 7 even when the foreign state being sued did not expro-
priate the property. In its 2009 decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
holdings that the foreign state against whom the claim is made need not be the foreign
state that expropriated the property,'s that the Foundation had engaged in commercial
12. See Notice of Proposal To Extend the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of Colombia Concerning the Imposition of Import Restric-
tions on Archaeological Material From the Pre-Columbian Cultures and Certain Ecclesiastical Material from
the Colonial Period of Colombia, 75 Fed. Reg. 52,582 (Aug. 26, 2010), available at http://exchanges.state.gov/
media/office-of-policy-and-evaluation/chc/pdfs/2010frncoextprop.pdf. See also LAWYER'S COMM. FOR CUL-
TURAL HERITAGE PRESERVATION, http://www.culturalheritagelaw.org/Default.aspx?pageld=5
9 5025 (last
visited Jan. 8, 2011).
13. Notice of Receipt of Cultural Property Request From the Government of the Hellenic Republic, 75
Fed. Reg. 52,582 (Aug. 26, 2010), available at http://exchanges.state.gov/medialoffice-of-policy-and-evalua-
tion/chc/pdfs/2010frncoextprop.pdf.
14. See Cassirer v. Spain, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in pan and remanded,
580 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2009). See also Patty Gerstenblith, InternationalArt and Cultural Heritage, 44 INT'L
LAW. 487, 492-93 (2010).
15. Cassirer, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1178-79.
16. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (2011).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) provides, in part, that a "foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction
of courts of the United States ... in any case ... in which rights in property taken in violation of international
law are in issue and that property . .. is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign
state and that agency or instrumentality . . . is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States." Id.
§ 1605(a)(3).
18. Cassirer, 580 F.3d at 1056.
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activity in the United States,' 9 and that Congress did not impose an absolute requirement
in the FSIA to exhaust local remedies. 20
The Ninth Circuit reconsidered this decision en banc21 and affirmed the panel decision
on these three issues.22 Relying on the plain meaning rule in statutory interpretation and
viewing the language of section 1605(a)(3) of the FSIA as clear, the court concluded that
no requirement existed that the foreign state being sued also be the foreign state that took
the property at issue in violation of international law.23 In defining what activity is com-
mercial in nature, the en banc decision agreed with the district court that commercial
activity is defined by its nature, not its purpose, and therefore need not be carried out for
profit. The defining criterion for commercial activities is that they are "the type of actions
by which a private party engages in trade and traffic or commerce." 24 Drawing upon the
precedent established in Altmann v. Republic of Austria,25 the decision concluded that the
defendant Foundation engaged in sufficient commercial activity in the United States, in-
cluding advertising of the defendant museum that utilized an image of the Pissarro paint-
ing and sales of posters, books, and catalogues, including images, to satisfy the FSIA's
requirement. 26
A forceful dissent focused on statutory interpretation and, in particular, whether the
expropriation exception applies to a foreign sovereign that was not complicit with the
wrongful taking of the property.27 The dissent argued that section 1605(a)(3) of the FSIA
was unclear because it used the passive voice and did not state who took the property.28
The dissent therefore gave the FSIA's legislative history greater weight in interpreting the
statute. The dissent viewed section 1605(a)(3) as parallel to the Hickenlooper exception
to the act of state doctrine, which states that "disputes over expropriated property were
justiciable when rights in property were asserted on the basis of a taking 'by an act of that
state in violation of the principles of international law."29 Further, the dissent argued that
the FSIA should be consistent with international law; a taking of property in violation of
international law is no longer a sovereign act and the foreign sovereign therefore loses its
immunity. Yet, a foreign sovereign that did not expropriate the property or was not other-
wise complicit in the expropriation did not violate international law and therefore should
not lose its immunity. 30 On December 10, 2010, the defendants filed a petition for certio-
rari to the Supreme Court.
19. Id. at 1057-59.
20. Id. at 1062.
21. See Cassirer v. Spain, 616 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010).
22. Id. at 1022.
23. Id. at 1028-30.
24. Id. (quoting Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992)).
25. See Altmann v. Austria, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002).
26. Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1019.
27. Id. at 1038 (Gould, J., dissenting).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1040 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2010)) (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 1040-41.
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B. AGUDAS CHASIDEI CHABAD OF UNITED STATEs v. RussIN FEDERATION
An interesting case involving both the FSIA and the act of state doctrine was resolved in
2010. Agudas Cbasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Federation involved a collection of
religious books and manuscripts belonging to Chabad. One part of the collection, com-
posed of religious books and manuscripts, was seized during the Russian Revolution (the
"Library") and a second part (the "Archives"), consisting of 25,000 pages of hand written
materials, was seized by Nazi Germany during the 1941 invasion of Poland and subse-
quently taken by the Red Army to Russia as war "trophies" and "booty." The Archives
and Library are still in Russia today.3'
In earlier proceedings, the district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the
claim as to the Library, finding that the defendant was entitled to sovereign immunity, but
denied the motion as to the Archives.32 The court found that the taking of the Library
was not in violation of international law, one of the prongs required under the exception
to foreign sovereign immunity in section 1605(a)(3).33 It reached this conclusion based on
the assertion that the Library was owned individually by the Rebbe, a citizen of Russia,
rather than by Chabad as a whole. 34 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed this holding and also the district court's holding that the Library had not
been "retaken" in 1991-92, when Chabad could not regain possession of the Library.35
The appellate court affirmed the holdings that the commercial use prong of the Section
1605(a)(3) exception was satisfied through activities of the Russian State Library and the
Russian State Military Archive in the United States and that there was no need for the
plaintiff to exhaust remedies in Russia before suing in the United States.36
Russia had also relied on the act of state doctrine to defend both claims. The district
court rejected this defense as to the Archive because it was expropriated outside of the
territorial boundaries of the then-Soviet Union,37 and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the deci-
sion.38 Yet, the district court had accepted the act of state defense as an alternative basis
for dismissing the claim as to the Library. 39 The D.C. Circuit reversed this holding.
First, the D.C. Circuit determined that the district court's holding that the "retaking" of
the Library in 1991-92 was protected by the act of state doctrine was incorrect because the
Second Hickenlooper Amendment 4o normally bars use of the act of state doctrine with
respect to expropriations of property that occurred after January 1, 1959.41 Second, the
D.C. Circuit vacated the district court's order that the act of state doctrine bars judicial
examination of the taking of the Library in the 1917-1925 period.
31. Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Fed'n, No. 05-1548, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78552, at *2-3
(D.D.C. July 30, 2010).
32. Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Fed'n, 466 F. Supp. 2d 6, 31 (D.D.C. 2006).
33. Id. at 17.
34. Id. at 21-22.
35. Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Fed'n, 528 F.3d 934, 943-46 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
36. Id. at 946-50.
37. Agudas Chasidei Chabad, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
38. Agudas Chasidei Chabad II, 528 F.3d at 951-52.
39. Agudas Chasidei Chabad, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
40. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2011).
41. Agudas Chasidei Chabad H, 528 F.3d at 953.
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While recognizing that this taking of the Library occurred within the sovereign terri-
tory of the Soviet Union, which would typically fit within the criteria of the act of state
doctrine, the D.C. Circuit relied on language in Sabbatino that the act of state doctrine is
not a rigid rule, but rather one that should take into account a variety of factors. 42 In
particular, the D.C. Circuit Court emphasized that the Soviet government is no longer in
existence and has been "succeeded by a radically different regime."43 The court recog-
nized that it could not evaluate the balance that should be given to this change in regime
in determining whether the act of state doctrine should apply. It therefore vacated and
remanded to the district court.44
On remand, the defendants refused to participate any further in the litigation and de-
faulted.45 Despite this default, the plaintiff still had to establish its right to relief by evi-
dence satisfactory to the court. The plaintiff showed that rights in property are at issue:
the defendant took plaintiffs property in violation of international law, the property is
owned or operated by agencies or instrumentalities of the foreign state, and the defend-
ants are engaged in commercial activity in the United States. The district court then
entered a default judgment.46 Russia then announced that it refused to recognize the
ruling.47 It is not clear what steps the plaintiff will take to recover the Library and
Archives, but it could attempt to attach Russian assets located in the United States.
A decision on the act of state doctrine as applied to the Soviet Union's nationalizations
of art works and other forms of cultural property in the 1917-1925 period would have
been interesting, as this question has arisen with respect to other disputed cultural objects.
For example, the outcome of a dispute concerning a van Gogh painting, The Night Cafi,
currently in the collection of Yale University and previously owned by a Russian art col-
lector, may turn on the applicability of the act of state doctrine.48
C. ODYSSEY MAINE EXPLORATION
Another case premised on the FSIA involves the disposition of a large quantity of coins
recovered from a historic shipwreck off the coast of Spain. In 2007, Odyssey Marine
Exploration, Inc., a Florida "company engaged in deep-water exploration of historic
wrecks and recovery of artifacts for commercial sale, announced the recovery of over
500,000 silver and gold coins and other artifacts from a [C]olonial era shipwreck code-
named Black Swan."49 Odyssey Marine Exploration described the wreck's location as in
international waters west of the Straits of Gibraltar, although it refused to disclose the
42. Id.
43. Id. at 954.
44. Id.
45. Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Fed'n, No. 05-1548 (RCL), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78552, at *1
(D.D.C. July 30, 2010).
46. Id. at *1.
47. Chabad Seeks to Recover its Archives and Library, Comm'N ART RECOvERY, http://www.commartrecov-
ery.org/cases/chabad-seeks-recover-its-archives-and-library (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
48. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Counterclaims by Plaintiff-Counterclaim
Defendant Yale University at 25-34, Yale Univ. v. Konowaloff, Case No. 3:09-CV-00466 (D. Conn., Oct. 5,
2009); see also Gerstenblith, supra note 14, at 498-99.
49. Press Release, Odyssey Marine Exploration, Odyssey Marine Exploration Announces Third Quarter
2007 Results, (Nov. 7, 2007), availabk at http://shipwreck.net/prl50.php; see also Patty Gerstenblith & Lucille
Roussin, Art and International Cultural Property, 42 INT'L LAw. 729, 741 (2008).
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exact location. Odyssey Marine imported the artifacts into the United States and then
filed claims in admiralty in federal district court in Florida, as a way of asserting its rights
in the shipwreck. Spain subsequently entered the proceedings, claiming ownership of any
Spanish property.50
In mid-2009, the magistrate judge decided the issues in favor of Spain, and the district
court judge issued an opinion adopting this decision in late 2009.51 The court concluded,
that based on the location of the wreck, historical accounts, the types and age of the coins,
the types of cannons, and other artifacts, there was no genuine factual question as to the
identification of the wreck as the Spanish naval vessel Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes, which
exploded in an engagement with the British in 1804.52 Asserting foreign sovereign immu-
nity, Spain argued that the U.S. court could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over
the wreck because none of the FSIA exceptions to immunity applied.
Courts traditionally exercise jurisdiction over shipwrecks, even if not within the territo-
rial waters of the nation where the court sits, based on constructive possession established
through actual possession of some of the contents of the wreck located within the court's
jurisdiction.53 Yet, the court's exercise of jurisdiction over the wreck is limited, particu-
larly where the wreck is the property of a foreign sovereign. The only means by which a
U.S. court can obtain jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign is through one of the FSIA's
enumerated exceptions, and Odyssey Marine failed to show that an exception applied.5 4
In addition to the question of foreign sovereign immunity, the Treaty of Friendship and
General Relations between the United States and Spain of 1902 calls on each nation to
accord vessels of the other nation "the same ... protection and . . . immunities which
would be granted to its own vessels."55 The district court cited several treaties and U.S.
statutes, including the Sunken Military Craft Act,56 stating that the law of finds does not
apply to "any foreign sunken military craft in" U.S. territorial waters, and "no salvage
rights or awards" will "be granted with respect to such" vessels, "without the express per-
mission of the . . . foreign state."
5 7
An interesting aspect of this litigation is that Peru intervened to assert its rights to the
cargo of specie. Peru argued that the specie originated from the area of Peru and was
removed by Spain as a result of colonialist exploitation.58 The court rejected the notion
that it could resolve Peru's claim for the same reason that it rejected Odyssey Marine's
50. Gerstenblith & Roussin, supra note 49.
51. Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel, 675 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1128-30
(M.D. Fla. 2009).
52. Id. at 1133-36.
53. Id. at 1137. But in another decision this past year, also involving Odyssey Marine Exploration, the same
district court judge refused to allow the theory of construction possession of a wreck's res to establish in rem
jurisdiction over the entire wreck when the salvor's claim was based on the law of finds. Odyssey Marine
Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, No. 8:08-cv-1044-T-23MAP,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXES 87658, at *22 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2010). This case involves artifacts recovered from
Le Marquis Tournay, a private French vessel that sank in the English Channel in the late nineteenth century.
Id. at *1.
54. Odyssey Marine Erploration, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 1138-39.
55. Id. at 1143-44.
56. Id.; 10 U.S.C. § 113 n. (2011).
57. Odyssey Marine Exploration, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 1143-44.
58. Id. at 1145-46.
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claim-that the court lacked jurisdiction over the wreck and its cargo because of Spain's
right to sovereign immunity for its property.5 9
In its substantive argument, Peru attempted to rely on Article 149 of the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea, which calls for preservation of "objects of an
archaeological and historical nature" with "particular regard being paid to the preferential
rights of the State or country of origin. . . . "60 The court, however, rejected this argu-
ment since neither Peru nor the United States has ratified this treaty, and the court did
not view this provision as a part of customary international law.61 Finally, the court con-
cluded that this dispute was best resolved through direct negotiations between Spain and
Peru, rather than through a suit in the courts of a third, otherwise uninvolved nation. 62
The court thus rejected the claims of both Odyssey Marine and Peru and ordered Odyssey
Marine to turn the ship's property over to Spain. This order has, however, been delayed,
pending Odyssey Marine's appeal.
Despite the considerable variety of factual circumstances and legal arguments, these
three cases all center on the applicability of the FSIA and, to a lesser extent, the act of state
doctrine. It is worth considering why the FSIA has become such a focus of litigation
concerning cultural property.63 There is no simple explanation, although in several of
these cases the FSIA seems to serve more as a basis for finding jurisdiction over the for-
eign sovereign in U.S. courts than as a means of protecting the foreign sovereign from
suit. This statute will continue to be tested not only through appeals64 but also in a new
case filed in 2010. The heirs of the Hungarian banker, Baron Mor Lipot Herzog, filed
suit in federal court in Washington, demanding return of a collection of art works which
they allege was placed in Hungary for safekeeping during World War II or placed there
when art works stolen by the Nazis were returned to Hungary at the end of the war.65
This case, and other decisions, will continue to elucidate when a foreign sovereign can be
sued in a U.S. court.
59. Id. at 1146.
60. See Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Final Act, art. 149, Dec. 10, 1982, 21
I.L.M. 1245.
61. Odyssey Marine Exploration, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 1146-47. The court rejected the use of customary inter-
national law because it concluded that international law contains little practice with respect to jurisdiction
over shipwrecks and there is no customary international law at all with respect to disputes among sovereigns
concerning underwater cultural heritage discovered in international waters. Id.
62. Id. at 1147-48. The court also relied on the act of state doctrine as an affirmative defense for a reason
to refrain from evaluating the actions of Spain in exploiting its former colony. Id.
63. The Supreme Court's decision in Altmann v. Austria, 541 U.S. 677 (2004), which concluded that the
FSIA, applied to actions that predated the FSIA's enactment, seems to have provided some of the impetus.
The Altmann decision ultimately led to the restitution of four Klimt paintings to the descendants of Adele
Bloch-Bauer.
64. The Seventh Circuit has yet to decide Iran's appeal, which was argued in October 2009, concerning its
right to immunity under the FSIA, in Rubin v. Iran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (N.D. Ill. 2004); see also Patty
Gerstenblith et al., Art and Cultural Heritage, 43 Irr'L LAw. 811, 822-23 (2009).
65. Carol Vogel, Hungary Sued in Holocaust Art Claim, N.Y. TIMEs, July 28, 2010, at Cl, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/arts/design/28lawsuit.html.
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IV. Legal Developments concerning Art Works Looted during the
Holocaust
A. BAAn v. VAVRA
The heirs of Franz Friedrich Grunbaum, a Viennese cabaret performer whose collec-
tion consisted of 449 artworks, claimed a 1917 Egon Schiele drawing, Seated Woman with
Bent Left Leg (Torso). Grunbaum executed a power of attorney, authorizing his wife to deal
with his assets while imprisoned at Dachau, where he died in 1941. Galerie Gutekunst, a
Swiss art gallery, purchased the drawing in 1956, apparently from Grunbaum's sister-in-
law, Mathilde Lukacs-Herzl. Later in 1956, the drawing was sold to the Galerie St. Eti-
enne in New York, from whom Bakalar bought the drawing in 1963. Bakalar consigned
the drawing to Sotheby's for sale in 2004, which subsequently froze the sale when the
Grunbaum heirs challenged Bakalar's title. Both parties sued in federal court in New York
seeking a declaratory judgment.
The district court awarded the drawing to Bakalar based on Swiss law, which the judge
deemed controlling. Under Swiss law, "one who acquires . . . an object in good faith
becomes the owner."66 Galerie Gutekunst was entitled to rely on a presumption that
Lukacs-Herzl was the owner and it therefore qualified as a good faith purchaser.67 Fur-
thermore, even if the drawing had been stolen, the original owner's ability to recover the
drawing expired five years after Galerie Gutekunst acquired it.68
On appeal, the Second Circuit first established the significant difference between Swiss
and New York law on the question of whether a good faith purchaser can acquire title to
stolen property. A good faith purchaser can acquire title to stolen property in Switzer-
land, and, at least at the time of the Galerie Gutekunst purchase, Swiss law presumed that
a purchaser acted in good faith. In addition, the court noted the difficulties that Holo-
caust victims and their heirs have had in recovering stolen art works under Swiss law.69
Under New York law, a good faith purchaser does not acquire title to stolen property,
although a claim for recovery may be barred by the statute of limitations or the equitable
defense of laches. 70 Because of this difference in Swiss and New York law, the court then
had to address the question of choice of law.
The district court judge had adopted the law of the situs where the drawing was located
at the time of its alleged transfer, i.e., Switzerland. Yet, the Second Circuit rejected this
rule and held that under New York choice of law rules, the appropriate law is the law of
the jurisdiction with the greater interest in the transaction.71 The court then concluded
66. Bakalar v. Vavra, No. 05 Civ. 3037 (WHP), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66689, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2,
2008), vacated and remanded, 619 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2010). See also Gerstenblith et al., supra note 64, at 818.
67. Bakalar, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *1.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 140.
70. Id. at 140-42 (describing New York's demand and refusal rule in relation to the statute of limitations for
the recovery of stolen property and the Court of Appeals decision in Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v.
Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991)).
71. Bakalar, 619 F.3d at 142-44. The Second Circuit relied on Istim, Inc. v. Chemical Bank, 581 N.E.2d
1042 (N.Y. 1991), rejecting "the traditional situs rule in favor of an interest analysis." The interest analysis
"begins with an examination of the contacts each jurisdiction has with the event giving rise to the cause of
action." 619 F.3d at 143-44. The Second Circuit also criticized the District Court's reliance on Elicofon v.
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that Switzerland's interest in the outcome based on a sale that took place decades ago and
with no present impact on the Swiss gallery was tenuous in contrast to New York's interest
"in preventing the state from becoming a marketplace for stolen goods."72 Once New
York law was chosen as the correct law, the question of whether the drawing had been
stolen, a question that the district court judge had deemed irrelevant under Swiss law,
became a crucial element to determine upon remand. Further, once the claimants met a
threshold showing, the burden fell on Bakalar to prove that a theft did not occur.73
B. GRosz v. MUSEUM OF MODERN ART
The heirs of George Grosz, an early twentieth-century German artist whose art works
were considered by the Nazis to be "degenerate" and who was forced to flee Germany in
1933, sued the Museum of Modern Art ("MoMA") to recover three of Grosz's caricatural
paintings, Hermann-Neise with Cognac, Self-Portrait with Model, and Republican Auto-
matons.74 The plaintiffs alleged that Grosz consigned the paintings to Grosz's art dealer,
Alfred Flechtheim, and that each was either stolen or subject to some other form of mal-
feasance. MoMA acquired the paintings at different times during the late 1940s and
1950s.75 On November 24, 2003, Ralph Jentsch, "managing director" of the Grosz estate,
asked MoMA to return the paintings to the Grosz estate. The plaintiffs filed their com-
plaint on April 12, 2009. MoMA moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
three-year limitations period had expired. 76
Because in New York the cause of action for the recovery from a good faith purchaser of
stolen property, including art works, accrues when the claimant demands return of the
property and the demand is refused, the question focused on when MoMA refused the
demand. The court defined "refusal" as words or actions that are inconsistent with the
claimant's possession or use of the property, regardless of whether the possessor explicitly
refuses the demand. Because the purpose of the "demand and refusal" rule is to give the
good faith possessor an opportunity to relinquish the property once informed of the
claimant's rights, a failure to turn over the property constitutes a refusal.77
The parties agreed that Jentsch's 2003 letter constituted the demand. The court con-
cluded that MoMA's failure to turn over the paintings, or a letter MoMA sent to the
claimants in 2005 communicating its refusal to turn over the paintings, meant that the
Kunstsammlungen zu Weimer, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982), in concluding that the law of the place of the
transaction should apply. 619 F.3d 143-46. According to the Second Circuit, the choice of New York law in
Elicofon is better explained as an application of the greater interest rule. Id. at 143-46.
72. Id. at 145.
73. Id. at 147. Judge Korman, sitting by designation with the Second Circuit panel, wrote a separate con-
curring opinion to emphasize that once the court concludes that Grunbaum gave up the drawing involunta-
rily, title could not pass to a subsequent purchaser under New York law. See id, at 148-52 (Korman, J.,
concurring).
74. Groszv. Museum of Modern Art, No. 09 Civ. 3706 (CM) (THK), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1667, at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2010), reconsideration denied, No. 09 Civ. 3706 (CM) (THK), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20248
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2010), aff'd, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25659 (2d Cit. 2010).
75. Grosz, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1667 at *5-16.
76. Id. at *16-17; see N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(3) (McKinney 2010).
77. Gross, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1667 at *24-26.
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refusal was made, at the latest, in 2005.78 This case is one of the few to address the precise
definition of what constitutes a refusal of a demand to return an allegedly stolen work of
art.
C. IN' RE FLAMENBAUM
In re Flamenbaum79 presents atypical facts concerning a cultural object stolen during the
Holocaust. German archaeologists excavated a gold cuneiform tablet dated to the reign of
the Assyrian King Tukulti-Ninurta I (1243-1207 B.C.) in the foundation of the Ishtar
Temple in the city of Ashur, now in Iraq, in 1913; later to be placed in the Vordera-
siatisches Museum in Berlin. At the beginning of World War II, the tablet was put in
storage but, at the conclusion of the war, was missing. Some sixty years later, it appeared
in a safe deposit box of Riven Flamenbaum, a Holocaust survivor and resident of Long
Island, New York. In the process of accounting for the estate, the Berlin museum was
notified of the tablet's presence, and the museum filed a claim to the tablet.
The court concluded that the museum had title superior to that of the Flamenbaum
estate and that, under New York's demand and refusal rule, the statute of limitations did
not bar the museum's claim, but the equitable defense of laches did.80 The court con-
cluded that the museum's delay in bringing its claim was unreasonable. The museum
failed to report the tablet as missing to any law enforcement agency or registry or to
undertake any investigation as to its whereabouts, despite the fact that the tablet was seen
in the hands of a New York dealer in 1954.81 On the second prong of the laches defense,
the court concluded that this unreasonable delay prejudiced the possessor 82 because the
museum's inaction meant that good faith purchasers did not receive notice of possible
defects in title and the death of Riven Flamenbaum foreclosed his ability to establish ti-
de.83 This decision is currently on appeal.
The Flamenbaum estate raised an interesting argument alleging that the tablet might
have been taken by the Soviet Union from Berlin as spoils of war and that the museum's
title was extinguished under international law and the laws of the Soviet Union and its
successors. 84 The museum argued, correctly, that the tablet could not be considered the
legitimate property of the Soviet Union under the 1907 Hague Convention and, it might
be added, under customary international law. The court chose not to resolve this legal
question because it could resolve the case more easily under the laches defense. It is,
however, unfortunate that the court left this argument unanswered because it conflicts
with both New York State precedent85 and international law. 86
78. Id. at *27-35. The claimants disagreed with this interpretation of the 2005 letter and characterized a
2006 letter as constituting the refusal. Id. at *35-38.
79. In re Flamenbaum, 899 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548-49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
80. Id, at 552-53.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 554 (stating that to assert a defense of laches, the defendant must also allege "injury, change of
position, intervention or equities, loss of evidence, or other disadvantage resulting from such delay").
83. Id.
84. Id. at 550-51.
85. See Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 810-12 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1966).
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D. CLAIMS OF SEGER-THOMSCHITZ
In 2009,87 two district court decisions denied claims by Claudia Seger-Thomschitz, the
legatee under the will of a son of Viennese art collector, Oskar Reichel, to recover two
Kokoschka paintings, Two Nudes (Lovers), currently in the collection of the Boston Mu-
seum of Fine Arts,88 and Portrait ofa Youth, possessed by Sarah Blodgett Dunbar.89 Both
decisions were affirmed in 2010. In the Museum of Fine Arts case, 90 the First Circuit,
applying the Massachusetts three-year limitations period for tort and replevin actions,
agreed that the claim would accrue when the claimant knew or reasonably should have
discovered the location of the stolen property.91 Because the Reichel family knew the
location of the painting for decades before Seger-Thomschitz claimed it, her claim was
barred by the statute of limitations. The First Circuit rejected Seger-Thomschitz's argu-
ments that use of the Massachusetts statute of limitation conflicts with, and is preempted
by, federal policies that encourage restitution of art works looted during the Holocaust era
and discourage use of technical defenses to bar such claims. 92
The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in barring Seger-Thomschitz's claim.93
Seger-Thomschitz's argument here was primarily that U.S. foreign policy, as articulated
in the Terezin Declaration, preempted prescription under Louisiana law.94 Yet, the court
held that Louisiana's prescription periods apply generally to any movable property claim
and does not represent any state policy specific to Holocaust victims. 95
E. PORTRAIT OF WALLY SETTLEMENT
Litigation concerning the disposition of Egon Schiele's painting, Portrait of Wally, be-
gan in early 1998, while it was on loan from the Leopold Museum in Vienna to the Mu-
seum of Modem Art in New York, and lasted until this past summer. After heirs of the
painting's original owner, Lea Bondi Jaray, identified the painting, the New York District
Attorney held it as evidence in a criminal investigation. When the New York Court of
86. See, e.g., Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 56, Oct. 18, 1907
(stating that "[a]ll seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to . .. works of art and science, is forbidden,
and should be made the subject of legal proceedings").
87. See Gerstenblith, supra note 14, at 495-96.
88. Museum of Fine Arts v. Seger-Thomschitz, No. 08-10097-RWZ, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58826, at *1-
2 (D. Mass. May 28, 2009).
89. Dunbar v. Seger-Thomschitz, 638 F. Supp. 2d 659, 661 (E.D. La. 2009).
90. Museum of Fine Arts v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2010).
91. Id. at 7.
92. Id. at 11-14. It is ironic to note the court's concluding thoughts that statutes of limitation are not
technicalities and that museums should follow the guidelines of the American Association of Museums-even
though those same guidelines state that "to achieve an equitable and appropriate resolution of claims, muse-
ums may elect to waive certain available defenses." Guidelines Concerning the Unlawful Appropriation of Obects
During the Nazi Era, Am. Ass'N OF MUSEUMS, Apr. 2001, http://www.aam-us.org/museumresources/ethics/
nazi-guidelines.cfm.
93. See Dunbar v. Seger-Thomschitz, 615 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2010).
94. Id. at 577-79. See Terezin Declaration, HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE, June 30, 2009, http://
www.holocausteraassets.eu/en/news-archive/detail/terezin-declaration/. See also Gerstenblith, supra note 14,
at 491-92.
95. Dunbar, 615 F.3d at 578-79.
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Appeals quashed the subpoena in 1999,96 federal agents seized the painting on the ground
that, as stolen property, it had been imported in violation of the U.S. Customs statute. 97
In 2009, the district court resolved most of the issues in favor of the U.S. government
and set a trial on the sole remaining issue-whether the Leopold Museum could rebut the
government's showing that Rudolf Leopold knew the painting had been stolen.98 Before
the trial could commence, however, the claim was settled.99 After being displayed at the
Museum of Jewish Heritage in New York, the painting was returned to Vienna. The
Leopold Museum paid the Bondi heirs a settlement of $19 million.
V. California Statute of Limitations for Recovery of Stolen Art Works
In 2009, the Ninth Circuit struck down as unconstitutional the California Holocaust
Art Recovery Statute of Limitations'0o on the grounds that a statute of limitations that
applies exclusively to art works looted during the Holocaust infringed on the federal gov-
ernment's exclusive power to conduct foreign affairs.' 0 This year, the California legisla-
ture amended its statute of limitations in several ways.
The California statute of limitations is unique in explicitly providing a discovery rule for
the accrual of a cause of action for the recovery of "any article of historical, interpretive,
scientific or artistic significance."10 2 Yet, it was not clear whether this discovery rule, en-
acted in 1983, applied to the recovery of property stolen before 1983. This year's amend-
ment clarifies that the discovery rule applies to claims based on pre-1983 thefts, thus
acknowledging that the interpretation of the statute given in Naftzger v. American Numis-
matic Society'o3 is correct.'0
Of perhaps greater significance, the amendment to Section 338 provides for a six-year
limitations period and an actual discovery rule for an action for the specific recovery of a
work of fine art brought against a museum, gallery, auctioneer, or dealer. 05 It further
applies to fine art removed from its owner by "a taking or theft by means of fraud or
duress." 06 The cause of action will accrue when the claimant or his or her agent actually
96. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Museum of Modern Art, 719 N.E.2d 897, 898-99
(N.Y. 1999).
97. See 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c) (2008); 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2006).
98. United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). See Gerstenblith, supra
note 14, at 495.
99. Randy Kennedy, With the End of a Legal Dispute, a Schiele Comes to Manhattan, N.Y. TIMEs, July 29,
2010, at C3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/30/arts/design/30arts-WITHTHEENDOFBRF.
html.
100. See CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 354.3 (West 2006).
101. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 578 F.3d 1016, 1025-29 (9th Cir. 2009); see
also Gerstenblith, supra note 14, at 494.
102. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 338(c)(2) (West 2006).
103. Naftzger v. Am. Numismatic Soc'y, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 792-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
104. AB 2765, 2010 Leg., (Ca. 2010). An act to amend Section 338 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Section
1(a)(3) and (b).
105. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 338(c)(3)(A) (West 2006).
106. Id. Duress is defined as "a threat of force, violence, danger, or retribution against an owner ... suffi-
cient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to perform an act that otherwise would not
have been performed or to acquiesce to an act to which he or she would otherwise not have acquiesced." Id.
§ 338(c)(3)(C)(iv).
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discovers both the identity and whereabouts of the artwork and information "sufficient to
indicate that the claimant has a claim for a possessory interest in the work of fine art." 0 7
This amended statute applies to "pending and future actions commenced on or before
December 31, 2017," including actions that have been dismissed if the judgment is "not
yet final or if the time for filing an appeal .. . has not expired," so long as the taking of the
work of fine art occurred within one hundred years before enactment of the amended
statute. 08 Finally, the amended statute provides that a party "may raise all equitable and
legal affirmative defenses," including equitable defenses of laches and unclean hands. 09
This amended legislation is notable for several reasons. California has long been the
only state that provides a specific statutory provision to the recovery of artworks and other
cultural objects. Yet, there had been disagreement among the California appellate courts
concerning to which actions this provision applied and whether it incorporated a con-
structive or actual discovery rule. The California Legislature acted not only to remove
these ambiguities but, more importantly, apparently to overturn the Ninth Circuit's strik-
ing down of the statute that had extended the time to recover artwork stolen during the
Holocaust. By removing any reference to the Holocaust, the legislature eliminated the
argument that extending the limitations period is preempted by the federal foreign affairs
power. On the other hand, the amended statute will clearly apply to the recovery of
artworks looted during the Holocaust, although it may apply in other scenarios as well. It
remains to be seen whether a statute extending a limitations period that has already ex-
pired to recover a specific work of art will receive further constitutional challenge.
107. Id. § 338(c)(3)(A)(ii). The statute further specifically precludes from actual discovery any constructive
knowledge imputed by law. Id. § 338(c)(3)(C)(i).
108. Id. § 338(c)(3)(B).
109. Id. § 338(c)(5).
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